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ABSTRACT
Internet connectivity is defined by a set of routing protocols which
let the routers that comprise the Internet backbone choose the best
route for a packet to reach its destination. One way to improve
the security and performance of Internet is to routinely examine the
routing data. In this case study, we show how interactive visual-
ization of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) data helps characterize
routing behavior, identify weaknesses in connectivity which could
potentially cripple the Internet, as well as detect and explain actual
anomalous events.
CR Categories: H.5.2 [Information Interfaces and Presentation]:
User Interfaces—Graphical User Interfaces (GUI); I.3.6 [Computer
Graphics]: Methodology and Techniques—Interaction Techniques
Keywords: anomaly detection, graph drawing, information visu-
alization, network security
1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet is crucial to business, government, education and many
other facets of society. However, Internet connectivity can be dis-
rupted by unintentional errors or malicious attacks, which have hap-
pened on several occasions. Therefore, it is very important to have
an effective way of studying various aspects of the Internet to im-
prove its security and stability.
Internet connectivity is maintained by routers using the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) [7] to communicate. A good way to un-
derstand the behaviors and performance of the Internet is thus to
collect and analyze BGP data. In the past, monitoring and ana-
lyzing network behaviors has been mainly done by looking at some
simple visual forms like x-y plots of statistical analysis results. This
case study demonstrates how interactive browsing of the visual rep-
resentations of archived BGP data can help users characterize a spe-
cific routing behavior in the Internet, identify weaknesses, as well
as detect and explain anomalous activity. We show that visual anal-
ysis of network data can make unique and important contributions
to Internet security systems.
2 INTERNET ROUTING DATA
We examine Internet routing history to discover traces left behind
by configuration errors and malicious attacks. Analyzing Internet
routing logs can also help determine the stability of the current rout-
ing system.
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2.1 BGP Data and AS Routes
Each network within the Internet is identified by its IP address pre-
fix. An example of an IP prefix is 128.120.0.0.0/16, which means
every host in the network shares the same first 16 bits: 128.120.
One or more networks within a single administrative domain is re-
ferred to as an Autonomous System (AS), and is assigned a unique
AS number.
Between two ASes, BGP is used to exchange network reachabil-
ity information so that eventually routers can forward data packets
to the correct destination. BGP routers exchange messages in the
form of BGP routes. A BGP route lists a particular IP prefix and
the path of ASes used to reach that prefix. For example, the BGP
route “128.120/16: (7,23,92)” means that the IP prefix 128.120/16
could be reached by first going to AS-7, then to AS-23, and finally
to AS-92. Instability of AS routes is a cause of concern, because it
impacts end-to-end communication and flow-caching.
2.2 Origin AS Changes (OASCs)
The last AS in an AS path is referred to as the Origin AS of that
prefix. In the AS route example of the Section 2.1, AS-92 is the
Origin AS of 128.120/16.
The Origin AS of a particular prefix can change if the prefix’s
ownership has changed, or because of valid network operations
or faults like router misconfiguration or intentional attacks. Faults
could cause data packets to be delivered to the wrong place.
We obtained archived daily BGP routing data over 480 days from
the Oregon Route Views server [6]. We recorded all the instances
that the Origin AS of an IP prefix changed. An Origin AS Change
(OASC) [10] is an entry in the form (Prefix,AS,Date,Type). Prefix
is the IP prefix whose Origin AS has changed. AS is a list of the
associated AS(es) of the change. Date is the date on which the
change occurred. Type is the type of the change.
OASCs are classified in eight different types. The details re-
garding the different OASC types are important to the users but are
not relevant in the discussion of the visual aspects of the system,
except that in our visual representation, we use different colors to
represent the eight types and we allow the user to focus on a subset
of the eight types. The users found these features to be useful.
This case study reports our effort in visualizing two aspects of
routing data: OASCs and AS route changes. By interacting with a
visual representation of the archived BGP data, the user is able to
explore the data to discover patterns of behavior, anomalous events,
errors, undesirable network characteristics, gaining a better under-
standing of Internet routing.
3 VISUAL DATA EXPLORATION
Recognizing anomaly in network data allows us to take corrective
action. Anomaly detection is the process of searching for behavior
deviating from normal network use. Most existing anomaly detec-
tion methods are based on statistical analysis, where user normal
profiles are expressed as sets of statistical measures [5]. In contrast,
Figure 1: Quadtree coding of IP prefixes. Left: Top levels of the
tree, and the most significant bits of the IP prefixes represented by
each sub-tree (sub-square). 4 lines representing AS numbers sur-
round the square representing the IP prefix space. Right: Actual
data. A line is drawn for every IP-AS pair in an OASC.
our visual-based approach can quickly detect anomaly without a
“normal” training set.
Our visual anomaly detection system is based on interactive data
exploration. Goldstein et al. [3] describe data exploration as an
iterative and interactive process initiated and directed by people.
Visual techniques in data mining and/or network intrusion detection
include [2] and [4].
Ahlberg and Shneiderman [1] promote visual-based methods as
a viable approach to information-seeking due to the ability of hu-
mans to recognize features in visual displays and recall related im-
ages to identify anomalies. According to Girardin [2], human per-
ception can notice even unexpected features.
Data exploration is an inherently iterative process. It is thus cru-
cial to provide the user with the tools to interactively change pa-
rameters, focus on certain details, and animate the data over time.
Our user interface design adopts two main principles given in [8]
to facilitate intelligent and productive computer-human interaction:
1) rapid, incremental and reversible actions, and 2) immediate and
continuous display of results.
4 VISUALIZING ORIGIN AS CHANGES
An OASC visualization system has been created. In this section, we
only describe how data values are mapped to graphical values and
how the user interacts with the system. The details of other aspects
of the system can be found in [9].
4.1 Visual Representation and Interac-
tion
Each IP address is mapped to one pixel on a square. The map-
ping is done in a quad-tree manner shown in Figure 1. A square
is repeatedly subdivided into 4 equal squares. In mapping a 32-bit
address to a square, we start with the first two most significant bits
of the address to place it in one of the 4 sub-squares. We repeatedly
use the next two most significant bits to place the prefix in a sub-
square within a sub-square until the prefix is in a square the size
of a single pixel or the bits of the prefix are exhausted. We use a
512×512 pixel square to represent the entire IP prefix space. Since
IP prefixes have masks at most 24 bits long, at most 64 different IP
prefixes map to the same pixel.
Figure 2 shows additional windows offering closeup views of
several different portions of the main window, which shows the en-
tire IP prefix space. With the additional level of zooming into a
portion of the data, individual IP prefixes can be distinguished. In
Figure 2: Data from January 2, 2000 to March 3, 2000. Colored
pixels in main window show involved prefixes resolved to first 18
bits. Zoom windows resolve prefixes completely.
the main window, a pixel is colored yellow if an OASC occurred on
the current day (March 3), brown if a change occurred on a previous
day. In the detail windows, a colored rectangle is shown for each
OASC. Its position is determined by the IP prefix, the size by the
mask, brightness determined by how long ago the change occurred
(present day data shown the brightest), and the hue by the type of
the OASC. The background of the main window is shaded accord-
ing to the IP prefix the pixel represents; the brighter the background,
the larger the IP prefix represented.
To represent the relationship between a prefix and its associated
AS number, we place 4 lines surrounding the IP square. An AS
number is mapped to a pixel on one of the 4 lines (see Figure 1).
A line is then drawn from an IP address to an AS number if there
is an OASC involving that IP address and that AS number. Since
there are more AS numbers than pixels, more than one AS number
maps to a pixel. Again, we provide zooming features for the user to
differentiate between AS numbers which map to the same pixel in
the main display. The lines representing changes for the AS(es) in
focus are shown with brighter colors to highlight the AS.
Our design shows one day’s data at a time, allowing the user to
animate the visualization, each frame showing consecutive day’s
data. With this “movie” display, the user can detect temporal pat-
terns. To assist our memory of patterns from previous days, we
allow a user-defined window of a certain number of days prior to
the currently shown date. Data from these previous days are dis-
played, but with darker colors, so that the current day’s data stand
out. A slider bar gives the user control of the date shown.
4.2 Anomaly Detection and Analysis
Two examples of anomaly detection and analysis using our OASC
visualization system are presented here.
The first is the discovery of event correlation via animation. Fig-
ure 3 shows a large number of CSM changes due to AS-15412 erro-
neously announcing prefixes belonging to many different ASes on
Apr 6, 2001, and the CMS changes over the next 6 days to correct
the error, before returning to normal on Apr 13. Figure 4 shows AS-
15412 making similar errors again on Apr 18, and the correspond-
ing CMS changes on the next day. A virtually identical pattern is
easily observed. From this pattern, the user infers that the events on
April 19 are corrective actions and not a new fault, demonstrating
the adeptness of humans in recognizing patterns.
The second example is an anomaly on Aug 14, 2000. We used
an alternative representation of the data, presented in Figure 5, In
Figure 3: CSM activity on April 6, 2001 involving AS-15412 fol-
lowed by 6 days of corrective CMS activity, before returning to
normal.
Figure 4: CSM activity on April 18, 2001 (left) involving many
different ASes followed by virtually identical CMS activity (right)
the next day. This indicates misconfiguration by a router, followed
by correction on the next day.
Figure 5: The regular pattern of OS-type (pink) changes on August
14, 2000 is highly suspicious. This pattern appeared because AS-
7777 erroneously announced ownership of consecutive prefixes.
Figure 6: Each node in the graph represents an AS, and each edge
represents a link between ASes. The brown lines show AS routes
within one minute during Nimda worm attack. These short-lived
routes are believed to be invalid. Normally, only one or two differ-
ent routes should be used in a one-minute period.
this 3D representation, each Origin AS change is mapped to a cube
on a horizontal plane in the same quad-tree manner. The vertical
position of the horizontal plane is based on its AS number. Each
cube is colored according to the type of change, as before. The OS-
type (pink) changes arranged in a regular pattern on one horizontal
plane are highly suspicious; they correspond to AS-7777 making
erroneous announcements of these IP prefixes. Noticing the grid of
pink cubes is trivial, but the same task would be very difficult for
a fully-automated system to detect unless this particular pattern has
been explicitly programmed into its pattern-matching mechanism.
5 VISUALIZING AS ROUTE CHANGES
Visualization can also help characterize routing behavior. The
brown lines in Figure 6 show all the routes to IP prefix 55/8 within
a minute during the Nimda worm attack in September 2001. Ani-
mation of the routes show many different routes involving various
ASes used in a very short period of time, indicating severe instabil-
ity.
To determine the stability of AS routes, it is necessary to ana-
lyze how they change over time. Statistics regarding the frequency
of such changes can be easily gathered and collated. However,
even when statistics such as the mean and deviation of AS route
changes are known, several key questions remain: How many of
these changes reflect true route changes and how many are just due
to temporary link failures? What are the patterns of route changes,
for example do the changes occur between two routes or many dif-
ferent routes? Are the different routes completely different or are
there ASes that are common all all the routes? Are any of the route
changes indicative of bad router implementation?
Figure 7 shows how these questions can be answered with ap-
propriate visualization of the data. At the bottom of the figure, the
number of announcements of AS route changes is plotted against
time. From this plot, it is observed that there is a two-month
period with significantly more announcements than usual. A 2-
year window shows unique AS routes used to reach a DNS server
(198.41.0.0). Each horizontal level represents a unique route. A
moving 2-hour window reveals very undesirable frequent switch-
ing between AS-4200 and AS-1 during a 2-month period. The user
was able to identify primary routes, secondary routes, periods of
instability, two instances of change in primary routes and overlap
between the routes.
Figure 7: Visualization of AS Routes to a DNS Server. In the 2-year window, each horizontal level represents one unique AS route. A pixel
is colored if in that time period, the AS route is used (note that in any period, more than one AS route may be used). Two changes in primary
routes are observed and labeled. A vertical line marks the current time, which is expanded into the 2-hour window. This window shows rapid
oscillation between two AS routes, which are highlighted in the network diagram above.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated how visualization made it easier to detect
and analyze anomalies, as well as to characterize Internet rout-
ing behavior and instability. Non-visual Internet security methods
would have much greater difficulty in correlating event, discovering
announcement of consecutive prefixes, and distinguishing between
different types of AS route changes. Animation of AS routes su-
perimposed on the network graph showed users the differences in
the routes, giving them hints regarding whether a particular node or
link may be a point of failure. With statistical analysis of AS route
changes, the user gets general information such as the average per-
sistence or prevalence of a route, whereas our case study shows that
with visualization of the data, the user was able to obtain much
richer information.
One lesson we have learned from this study is that multiple rep-
resentations are sometimes needed for understanding different as-
pects of the data. We also found that visual metaphors often have
to be customized for particular applications. From user feedbacks,
we confirm that interactivity and an intuitive interface are crucial to
successful data exploration.
In our continuing work, we will apply the visualization tool to
analyze more data from different IP prefix sources and observation
points, with the goal of discovering as yet unknown problems. Un-
derstanding routing behavior and recognizing weaknesses, attacks
and faults from BGP data would help make the Internet more stable
and secure.
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